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TECHNOLOGICAL CHALLENGE
TO THE SHARED ENVIRONMENT:
UNITED STATES PRACTICE
By Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr.*
I. INTRODUMON

In an era of expanding interest in international environmental problems,'
it is essential to examine the rapidly developing state practice concerning
man's startling capability, through the use of technology without any
hostile intent, adversely to alter not just the immediate environment of his
neighbor but common resources shared by all. The present discussion
does not attempt to deal with the practice of all states, but rather considers the extent to which legally relevant expectations of restraint are
being shaped by United States practice concerning the use of novel technology in the res communis. 2 The focus on United States practice reflects
the belief that, within the confines of a law journal article, considerable
light may be shed on world community expectations by an examination
of the practice of a state which has a major interest in the field and which
is a significant participant in the international law-creating process. If
consistent principles can be found to underlie United States practice, a
first step might be taken toward identifying areas of consensus essential
both to the ultimate fashioning of viable institutions 3 and to the existence
of some degree of environmental order before comprehensive agreements
4
are reached.
University of Colorado School of Law.
Materials relating to the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment
vividly demonstrate the interest. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2581, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at
44, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969); Reports of the Preparatory Committee for the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Docs. A/CONF.48/PC.6 (1970), A/CONF.48/PC. 9 and 13 (1971).
2"Res communis," as used here, is synonymous with "shared environment," and includes the atmosphere, outer space, oceans and deep seabeds. Space does not permit
discussion of activities within national territories which indirectly affect the res communis, except to the extent that they are involved in the case law. See generally Hardy,
'International Control of Marine Pollution," 11 Nat. Res. J. 296, 302-309 (1971).
Concerning deep seabeds as res communis, see text at note 76 below.
$For discussion of the appropriate institutional machinery, see, e.g., Hardy, Zoo. cit.
note 2 above, at 344-348; Jenks, "The New Science and the Law of Nations," 17 Int.
and Comp. Law Q. 327, 336-339 (1968); Kennan, *To Prevent a World Wasteland,"
48 Foreign Affairs 401 (1970); Schachter, "Scientific Advances in International Law
Making," 55 Calif. Law Rev. 423, 426-429 (1967).
- Emerging areas of consensus may also provide a basis for an intermediate lawmaking
stage between non-regulation and formal agreement, such as the U.N. Declaration on
the Human Environment. See 2d & 3rd Reports of the Preparatory Committee for the
U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Does. A/CONF.48/PC. 9, at 16-17,
and A/CONF.48/PC.13, at 38-41 (1971). See also Jenks, loc. cit. note 3 above, at 339;
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The uncertainty of the occurrence and severity of ultimate harm, and
the inability in many cases to identify a given state as uniquely affected
by a threat to the common environment, present a significant challenge to
an international legal system seeking to balance national freedom of nonbelligerent action against the need to protect inclusive world interests.
Imposition of pecuniary responsibility generally would not be adequate
to deal with such problems. 5 Consequently the discussion will neglect
the law's potential function as a re-allocator of costs through liabilitycreation, and will deal with the extent to which emerging norms of prior
restraint are suggested by U.S. practice. The emphasis will be on major
technology having high political visibility.,
II. DmmoMNrs oF

EXPECrATIONS CONCEwNING THE ENVI0NMENT

A. ExpectationsStemming from InternationalCase Law
Inquiry must begin with the Trail Smelter Case,7 a decision involving
the United States which provides the leading internationally adjudicated
precedent on environmental pollution. Fumes from the Trail Smelter, a
privately owned plant in Canada, were damaging agricultural property
in the State of Washington. One of the questions presented was "...
whether the Trail Smelter should be required to refrain from causing
damage in the State of Washington in the future and, if so, to what extent... "8 The tribunal concluded that
...under the principles of international law, as well as of the law
of the United States, no State has the right to use or permit the use
of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or
to the territory of another or the properties or persons therein, when
the case is of serious consequence and the injury is established by
clear and convincing evidence. 9
Schachter, loc. cit. note 3 above, at 426. Cf. Declaration of Principles Governing the
Sea Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, beyond the Limits of National
Jurisdiction, G.A. Res. 2749, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 24, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970);
10 Int. Legal Materials 220 (1971).
5 See Hardy, oc. cit. note 2 above, at 300, 312, note 44; Schachter and Serwer, "Marine Pollution Problems and Remedies," 65 A.J.I.L. 84 (1971); Report of the Secretary
General to the Seabed Committee, Study on International Machinery, 25 U.N. GAOR
Supp. 21, at 61, 113-114, U.N. Doe. A/8021 (1970).
6 In order to facilitate perception of the law's growth process, the discussion will
stress the law-creating and law-reflecting r6les of the mutual expectations of national and
international decision-makers. See, e.g., McDougal, "'The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and
the International Law of the Sea," 49 AJ.I.L. 356 (1955); M. McDougal, H. Lasswell
and I. Vlasic, Law and Public Order in Space 115-120 (1963). For recent doctrinal
expressions stressing the capacity of international lav to change with events, see the
dissenting opinions of Judges Koretsky and Tanaka in the North Sea Continental Shelf
Cases, [1969] I.C.J. Rep. 155 and 172.
7 United States v. Canada, preliminary decision, 3 Int. Arb. Awards 1911 (1938), 33
A.J.I.L. 182 (1939); final decision, 3 Int. Arb. Awards 1938, 35 A.J.I.L. 684 (1941).
8 Convention with Canada for the Establishment of a Tribunal ...

,

April 15, 1935,

Art. HI, 49 Stat. 3245 (1935m-1936), T.S. No. 893; 30 A.J.I.L. Supp. 163 (1936).
93 Int. Arb. Awards at 1965, 35 A.J.I.L. at 716 (1941).
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The Trail Smelter Case involved use of territory in a way that caused
pollution damage in adjoining territory. The situation with which we are
concerned, however, is limited neither to events occurring within the
respondent state's territory nor to damage uniquely suffered within the
territory of another state. These distinctions deserve brief mention, leaving aside for a moment the problems of imposing prior restraint and of
establishing likelihood and extent of damage.
If the state is the actor in a public capacity, there is clearly no ground
for avoidance of responsibility simply because the activities occur beyond
national boundaries. As the state's participation becomes less direct,
ranging from state-supported commercial activities to various forms of
acquiescence in private ventures, the issue becomes increasingly difficult.
It appears, however, that the policy embodied in Trail Smelter applies
to any case in which the state has an active participation or in which its
nationals are not subject to the jurisdiction of any other interested state
to prescribe and enforce injunctive rules. Even if the United States had
jurisdiction to prescribe on the ground that the pollution was felt in its
territory,10 it could not readily have enforced any rules prescribed. Canada
was in a position to control the activities in question. The situation
would not be fundamentally different if the pollution had emanated from
a private Canadian-registered ship, aircraft or ocean floor station. The
result does not depend on fictional extensions of Canadian territory, but
on the need to repose responsibility in the state most capable of assuming
itu1

On the second point, it might be asked whether individual states have
a sufficient interest in prospective harm to the res communis to be effective participants in the law-creating process of assertion and counterassertion. 12 There may be cases, of course, in which the maximum possible
damage is so slight that no state will have a sufficient interest to merit
protection. But whenever there is a signficant threat of harm to the res
10 See Restatement 2d, Foreign Relations Law of the United States §18 (1965).

11 Cf. Beesley, "Rights and Responsibilities of Arctic Coastal States: The Canadian
View," 3 J.Maritime Law and Commerce 1, 10 (1971). In all cases there would be
some state capable of applying and enforcing injunctive rules. Cf. Convention on the
High Seas, April 29, 1958, Art. 5, (1962) 2 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S.
82, 52 A.J.I.L. 842 (1958); and see Convention on the Continental Shelf, April 29,
1953, Arts. 2, 5, (1964) 1 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311, 52 A.J.I.L.
858 (1958); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§1331-43 (1970), 48
A.J.T.L. Supp. 110 (1954); Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and Ocean
Floor .... par. 14, loc. cit. note 4 above; Draft Convention on International Liability
for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Arts. II and I, 10 Int. Legal Materials 965
(1971). Analysis of jurisdictional difficulties lies beyond the scope of the present discussion, which is intended simply to show that the principle embodied in the Trail
Smelter decision should not be limited to occurrences within the respondent state's
territory.
12 It has been questioned whether states have sufficient rights in fish in the high seas
to be entitled to damages if the fish are injured. See McDougal and Schlei, "The Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawful Measures for Security," 64 Yale Law J.648,
694, note 239 (1955). Cf. Hardy, loo. cit. note 2 above, at 299-300; Legault, "The
Freedom of the Seas: A License to Pollute?", 21 Toronto Law J.211, 217-218 (1971).
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communis, an international legal order lacking institutions capable of
effective public representation cannot require a showing of unique interest
on the part of objecting states as a prerequisite to standing. This is particularly so when the claim is preventive rather than pecuniary, since the
problem of allocating compensation among claimants does not arise.
It has been asserted that the Trail Smelter tribunal did not "unequivocally" face the issue whether a state may carry on conduct for which
it is liable in damages, since the decision referred to the desire expressed
by the parties in the compromtq to reach a final solution.13 Canada did
not actively contest its responsibility for the conduct of the smelter. The
Canadian Government was determined, however, to protect the smelter
as a continuing enterprise. 14 It was willing to accept a result which was
equitable to interests in the United States, and this seems to explain the
provision in the compromis referring to the parties' desire to reach a
"just" (not "final") solution."a There is no indication that the tribunal
understood this to signify anything other than the expression of a desire
to arbitrate in good faith and to arrive at a fair result. The tribunal did
not rely on the provision in its enunciation of Canada's duty, and in fact
said that the duty arose "[a]part from the undertakings in the Convention. . . ." I' The decision consequently is relevant to the development
of expectations concerning a duty to refrain from environmentally injurious conduct.17
If the decision is viewed as the ratification of a position already taken
by the parties, Canada's acquiescence in the U.S. claim has independent
legal significance. The United States had asserted a right to be relieved
of air pollution originating in Canadian territory. Thus if Canada's response was tantamount to an acquiescence, the law-creating process of
U.S. claim and Canadian response would create roughly the same expectations as to norms of future conduct as does the tribunal's decision
if considered separately. It is more convincing, however, to treat the
case as a precedent established by a decision-making body external to the
disputants.
This leaves for consideration the extent of actual or prospective injury
necessary to support a norm of restraint, and the standard of proof of
injury required. The Trail Smelter tribunal limited its holding to eases
"... of serious consequence [where] the injury is established by clear
and convincing evidence." In many cases the injury will be prospective
13 McDougal and Schle, loc. cit. note 12 above, at 694, 694-695, note 241. See also
Mercer, "International Law and the French Nuclear Weapons Tests," Pt. 2, 1968 New
Zealand Law Rev. 418, 419.
14 See Read, "The Trail Smelter Dispute," 1963 Canadian Yr. Bk. Int. Law 213, 227228.
-.Convention with Canada, loc. cit. note 8 above, Art. IV.
16 3 Int. Arb. Awards at 1965-1966, 35 A.J.I.L. at 717 (1941). See L. Hydeman and
V. Berman, International Control of Nuclear Maritime Activities 278, note 504 (1960).
L7Cf. Secretary General, Survey of International Law in Relation to the Work of
Codification of the International Law Commission, U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/1/Rev. 1, at 34
(1949) (duties exemplified by the award in the Trail Smelter Case encompass those "of
a preventive nature").
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only, and its extent could not be established in advance by clear and
convincing evidence.' That is the heart of the problem: the consequences
of using major new technology cannot be clearly foreseen. If restraint
is postponed until there is clear and convincing evidence of serious harm,
consequences affecting large areas of common resources may have ensued.
In some cases the effect may be irreversible.
The Trail Smelter standard would extend comfortably to cases in which
the likelihood (rather than the existence) of injury is established by clear
and convincing evidence.- 9 This, however, does not meet the essence of
the problem mentioned above, where the likelihood of serious injury is
not fully established. One may wonder whether a disinterested decisionmaker thirty years after Trail Smelter, in a world awakened to the existence
of environmental deterioration, would find the "clear and convincing"
standard literally applicable when there are plausible consequences magnified far beyond those considered in that case. It would be consistent
with the approach taken by the Trail Smelter tribunal to apply a reasonableness test, with potentially greater harm calling for abstention from
conduct under a proportionately lesser showing that the harm will occur.
Nevertheless, Trail Smelter itself does not go so far; at most, by applying
essentially a reasonableness standard it points the way to such a result.
Other decisions of international tribunals are marginally relevant at
best.20 The Trail Smelter Case stands as the leading case authority, to be
tested against expectations arising from the conduct and pronouncements
of other decision-makers.
B. State Practice
The question at this point is whether national decision-makers in practice involving the United States have conducted themselves in such a way
as to reflect or induce expectations of restraint in the use of technology,
based on perceptions of harm to the world's common resources. If a
state abstains from acting in a certain way or from acting at all in a
given situation, it may be for any number of reasons, not all of which
have legal significance. 21 But it goes too far to say that abstention within
the discretion of a state cannot affect the formation of new custom. 22 The
isCf. L. Hydeman and W. Berman, op. cit. note 16 above, at 280-281; Taubenfeld,
"Nuclear Testing and International Law," 16 Southwestern Law J.365, 401-402 (1902).
19 This was the standard applied to prospective damage from water pollution in New
York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 309 (1921), on which the Trail Smelter tribunal relied.
20See the Lake Lanoux Arbitration (France V. Spain), 12 Int. Arb. Awards 281,
1957 Int. Law Rep. 101, 53 A.J.I.L. 156 (1959); Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom
v. Albania), [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 4, 43 A.J.I.L. 558 (1949). In the latter case the Court
took note of ".... every State's obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used
for acts contrary to the rights of other States." [1949] I.C.J. Rep. at 22. Such language
does little to delineate expectations beyond the facts of the case, since it assumes rights in
the complaining states.
2
3 See, e.g., Case of the S.S. 'Lotus," (1927) P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 10, at 28; C. Parry,
The Sources and Evidences of International Law 63-64 (1965).
22See K. Wolfke, Custom in Present International Law 69 (1964), discussing the
views of Sorensen.
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International Court has relied on state restraint as evidence of the existence of an international norm restricting freedom of action.23 If freedom
of action might plausibly be asserted, and if purely selfish interests would
normally be served by action (or by less restraint than is observed), inaction or restrained action is legally significant.24
The technologically advanced states (particularly the United States)
have on several occasions taken action which has had potentially harmful
consequences for common resources. In order to determine whether these
preclude the emergence of any meaningful restriction, it will be necessary
to examine the degree of restraint observed, the process of claim and reaction set in motion, the interests at stake
and the instances in which
25
action might have been taken but was not.

1. Nuclear Tests in the Atmosphere
Significantly, those who have asserted the lawfulness of atmospheric
nuclear tests (by states not bound by prohibitory treaty obligations) have
not spoken in terms of unrestrained freedom of action. Rather, they have
relied on a reasonableness standard evidenced by existing state practice.
This standard stresses the minimum possible interference with such legitimate interests of non-testing states as use of shipping lanes and fishing
rights." Emphasis is given to the vital security interests of the testing
state and of those reliant on it for protection.2 7 Such a rationale would
not extend to environment-endangering unilateral conduct beyond areas
of overriding importance to the acting state. Even in the areas of permissible conduct, the rationale dictates the exercise of maximum selfrestraint, based on the interests of other states, consistent with the acting
state's execution of its vital policy.
2S Nottebohm Case, [1955] I.C.J. Rep. 4, 21-22. The Court said that the practice of
certain states in refraining from extending diplomatic protection to nationals who have
severed the links of nationality ". . . manifests the view of these States that, in order
to be capable of being invoked against another State, nationality must correspond with
the factual situation."
214See the separate opinion of Judge Jessup in Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co.,
[1970] I.C.J. Rep. 4, 186, asserting that abstention from affording diplomatic protection
to companies incorporated in the state but not otherwise linked to it, ". . . being as it
were 'against interest,' has special probative value." See also H. Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the International Court 380 (1958); Virally, "The
Sources of International Law," in Manual of Public International Law 116, 130-131
(M. Sorensen ed., 1968).
2 We are dealing with events compressed into a relatively short period-roughly
since World War II. Nevertheless, the use of technology has provided sufficient opportunities for challenge to permit the formation of legally relevant expectations. See
generally Virally, oc. cit. note 24 above, at 131-132. Cf. North Sea Continental Shelf
Cases, oc. cit. note 6 above, at 42-43.
2
6 See McDougal and Schlei, oc. cit. note 12 above, at 682-686.
27See M. McDougal and W. Burke, The Public Order of the Oceans 772 (1962);
McDougal and Schlei, loc. cit. note 12 above, at 690-695; U.S. Delegation Paper for
the U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, "Legality of Using the High Seas in Connection with Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Pacific Ocean," 4 Whiteman, Digest of International Law 546-550 (1965).
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It is significant, also, that atmospheric nuclear testing instigated a
process of claim and counterclaim among decision-makers, many of whom
have not been willing to accept even such a limited rationale. The
counterclaims, culminating in the partial Test Ban Treaty, have increasingly emphasized the environmental hazard. 2 1 Although the treaty probably would not have emerged, absent a belief by the United States and
the Soviet Union that they had- substantially accomplished the national
security goals attainable from atmospheric testing, rising fears of persistent environmental harm provided the negotiators with considerable
incentive to agree. 29 The Test Ban Treaty reflects a growing consensus
based on the judgment shared by the United States and the Soviet Union
-though not yet by France and the People's Republic of China-that
the political and military benefits from further atmospheric testing are
outweighed by the (uncertain) environmental as well as out-of-pocket
costs.

0

2. Waste Disposal
Much of the controversy concerning disposal at sea has centered on
radioactive wastes. No state has asserted the unrestricted right to dispose of radioactive wastes in the oceans without safeguards. 31 It seems
clear that any sizable disposal of low-level radioactive waste in the seas
without protection would violate existing norms, as would any disposal at
2
sea of high-level radioactive matter.
The response of members of the international community to disposal
of even low-level wastes has been instructive. Some have objected flatly
to any disposal at sea. 32 Others have been less rigid. None are sanguine
28See G.A. Res. 1762A, 17 GAOR Supp. 17, at 3, U.N. Doe. A/5217 (1962); Treaty
Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water,
Aug. 5, 1963, Preamble, (1963) 2 U.S.T. 1313, T.LA.S. No. 5433, 430 U.N.T.S. 43; 57
A.J.I.L. 1026 (1963). See also Report of Subcommittee III of the U.N. Seabed Committee, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/62, at 14-16 (1971) (responses to recent French tests).
29 See A. Dean, Test Ban and Disarmament: The Path of Negotiation 83-84 (1966);
H. Jacobson and E. Stein, Diplomats, Scientists, and Politicians 126-127, 346, 381-382,
423 (1966).
30 Underground testing continues despite fears that some tests are or may be environmentally harmful. Japan and Canada protested the November, 1971, U.S. test at
Amchitka Island. See New York Times, Nov. 7, 1971, at 64, col. 4. It appears, however,
that no radiation leakage or other significant environmental harm occurred. bid., Nov.
8, 1971, at 78, col. 1; Nov. 14, 1971, §4, at 2, col. 3.
3
1 See, e.g., statement of the representative of the IAEA, 47 U.N. ECOSOC 196, U.N.
Doc. E/SR.1629 (1969); statement of the U.S. delegate, 4 U.N. Conf. on the Law of
the Sea 85, U.N. Doe. A/CONF.13/40 (1958). Art. 2 of the Convention on the High
Seas requires that freedom of the seas "be exercised by all States with reasonable regard
to the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas."
32 See M. McDougal and W. Burke, op. cit. note 27 above, at 861-862.
Cf. Brown,
"International Law and Marine Pollution: Radioactive Waste and 'Other Hazardous Substances," 11 Nat. Res. J. 221, 234-235 (1971). For the distinction between high- and
low-level wastes, see Ramey, "Radiation Protection-Past, Present and Future," 11
Atomic Energy Law J. 1, 18-24 (1969).
33 See U.N. Doe. A/CONF.13/C.2/L.118, in 4 U.N. Conf. on the Law of the Sea 149,
U.N. Doe. A/CONF.13/40 (1958); summary records of the 29th meeting in ibid. 83,

1972]

TECHNOLOGICAL CHALLENGE TO SHAI ED ENVIRONMENT

297

about disposal. The World Health Organization in 1961 adopted a resolution requesting ". .. urgently all the Members . . . to prohibit all discharge of radioactive waste into watercourses or the sea, to the extent
that the safety of such discharge has not been proved.. . ." 3 It is noteworthy that the standard adopted was abstention until safety is proved.
The United States opposed the W.H.O. resolution, in part on the ground
that the resolution prejudged the question of whether pollution had occurred." Yet the United States shortly thereafter acted in a manner
consistent with the resolution when it acquiesced in Mexican protests
against the proposed issuance of a license to dispose of low-level radioactive waste in the Gulf of Mexico. The license had been conditionally
approved, and an Atomic Energy Commission hearing examiner had found
that the disposal would create no danger. After the Mexican protests,
Thus the United States rehowever, the license was finally denied.,
sponded to a protest based on environmental grounds, and abstained from
acting despite the announced and unreversed opinion of an official factfinder that no danger to the shared environment had been shown.
Community reaction to radioactive waste disposal at sea led to the
inclusion of a provision in the Convention on the High Seas obligating
parties to "take measures to prevent pollution of the seas from the dumping of radioactive waste. . . ." -7 The meaning of "pollution" was not
set forth,38 and the contemplated measures were not identified. Consequently the measure of the duty is unclear. Nevertheless the provision is
couched in terms of duty, and reflects a community standard calling for
preventive measures to preserve the ocean environment from a perceived
but uncertain harm. Such a general standard does not supply specific
guidelines for conduct, but does provide a normative setting for state practice. It is relevant to an attempt to distinguish custom from mere usage
when waste disposal conduct is assessed.
85-87 (proposals by members of the Communist bloc). See also M. McDougal and W.
Burke, op. cit. note 27 above, at 860, note 413 (Soviet Union insists that disposal at sea

is unlawful).

34 W.H.O. Res. WHA/14.56, 14 World Health Assembly, No. 110, Pt. I, at 24 (1961).

3 4 Whiteman, Digest of International Law 725-727 (1965).
'
Ibid. 612-618. See In the Matter of Industrial Waste Disposal Corp., 2 A.E.C.
Rep. 70 (1962). For further discussion, see L. Hydeman and V. Berman, op. cit. note
16 above, at 305; M. MeDougal and W. Burke, op. cit. note 27 above, at 861.
(The convention
37 Convention on the High Seas, Art. 25(1), loc. cit. note 11 above.
came into force for the United States after it had denied the Gulf of Mexico license.)
It is arguable that Art. 25(1) is a codification of pre-existing customary law. The preamble to the convention speaks of a desire to "codify" existing rules and to adopt provisions which are "generally declaratory of established principles of international law."
Compare Baxter, "Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary International Law,"
41 Brit. Yr. Bk. Int. Law 275, 289 (1965-1966), doubting that this provision reflected
observable custom. See also Baxter, "Treaties and Custom," 129 Hague Academy,
Recueil des Cours 25, 54 (1970).
s8 For the definition asserted by the United States, see 4 Whiteman, Digest of International Law 726 (1965).
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The United States has issued no new licenses for radioactive waste
disposal at sea since 1960. 39 Beginning in 1962, the Atomic Energy Commission has designated land sites for disposal, and sea disposals under
pre-1960 licenses have been drastically reduced. Since 1967 no disposals
appear to have been made in the Atlantic and only 28 containers (of
low-level waste) in the Pacific.40 The announced reasons for the switch
to land disposal stress the expense of adequate containers for sea disposal. 4" The economic rationale, however, does not deprive the switch
of normative significance. The fact that expensive containers are required
for sea disposal is indicative of the recognition of a need for extreme
caution. Economic benefits may have ensued from the change, but much
of the impetus came from voiced concern on the part of the international
community that sea disposal, despite the lack of a showing of present
damage, involves too great a risk of eventual harm. It is virtually inconceivable that the United States could assert a right to revert to its
pre-1962 level of sea disposal without evoking widespread international
protests on normative grounds, nor is it likely that the United States
would attempt to resume large-scale sea disposals even if it became economically advantageous to do so.
The precedent is probably limited to situations in which there is a reasonably available alternative to the potentially deleterious use of the res
communis, as is the case in the United States with its large land mass
providing sites for underground disposal. The United Kingdom and other
countries in Western Europe, with relatively small territories, continue to
dispose of limited quantities of low-level radioactive waste in the oceans
under strict controls and pursuant to international consultations.42
Similar questions are raised by disposal of obsolete munitions at sea.
The rationale given in 1970 by the United States for ocean dumping of
39 H.R. Rep. No. 92-361, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (1971). For national security reasons, the United States continues to operate nuclear-powered naval vessels which occasionally emit very small amounts of radioactivity. The Navy does not permit sea disposal of solid radioactive waste from its nuclear ships. See Hearings on Ocean Waste
Disposal before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. 62-75 (1971).
40See Council on Environmental Quality, Ocean Dumping: A National Policy 7
(1970); Belter, "Recent Developments in the United States Low-Level Radioactive
Waste-Management Program-A Preview for the 1970s," in International Atomic Energy
Agency, Symposium on Management of Low- and Intermediate-Level Radioactive Wastes
155, 176 (1970).
47ibid. 176-177. There appears to be no showing of present harm from sea disposals
of radioactive waste. See 13 I.A.E.A. Bulletin, No. 1, at 26, 27 (1971); Schachter and
Serwer, loc. cit. note 5 above, at 107.
42For U.K. practice, see West, "Operational Experience in the Handling, Treatment
and Disposal of Radioactive Wastes at a Research and Development Establishment," in
I.A.E.A. Symposium, op. cit. note 40 above, at 235, 243-245; Royal Comm'n. on Environmental Pollution, 1st Report, Cmnd. No. 4585, at 25 (1971). The Soviet Union, with
its large land mass, does not dispose of radioactive waste at sea. See W. Butler, The
Soviet Union and the Law of the Sea 187 (1971). The United States has recognized
the need for a reasonable alternative before ocean disposal of municipal waste can be
fully discontinued. See Hearings, op. cit. note 39 above, at 265, 283.
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nerve gas was restricted to strictly controlled disposal of a limited quantity of a substance which could not feasibly be disposed of in any other
manner.'" There was no claim of right to engage in systematic disposal.
Even such a circumscribed proposal evoked protests on normative grounds
from the U.N. Secretary General, based on community expectations of
co-operation in the preservation of ocean environmental quality."4

More-

over, the U.N. Seabed Committee formally registered its concern, and
appealed to all governments ".

.

. to refrain from using the sea-bed and

ocean floor as a dumping ground for toxic, radio-active and other noxious
materials which might cause serious damage to the marine environment." 45
The United States subsequently announced that it was suspending ocean
disposal of munitions on the ground that too many environmental questions were unanswered." 6 Evolving U.S. practice concerning munitions
disposal thus reinforces the radioactive waste precedent. In each case
the clear evolution is toward a duty to abstain even though the probability
of actual harm is not objectively established.
The United States has permitted disposal of municipal and industrial
waste in the oceans in quantities which appear to have caused some
harm.'4 The harm, however, has been relatively localized and apparently
has thus far affected primarily the interests of the United States. At this
writing, it appeared that Federal legislation would be enacted to control
such disposal. 48 Similarly, the United States has proposed a draft ocean
4 See New York Times, July 30, 1970, at 11, col. 1 (City ed.); ibid., Aug. 4, 1970,
at 1, col. 4.
"4Ibid., Aug. 8, 1970, at 8, col. 6. The protest was based in part on Art. 25(2) of
the Convention on the High Seas, discussed in the text at note 138 below. See also
Brown, loc. cit. note 32 above, at 253-254. Iceland officially protested against the disposal, and the Government of the Bahamas made similar representations to the U.K. and
the U.S. See 18 Keesing's Contemporary Archives 24386 (Jan. 9-16, 1971). The U.S.
Department of State had determined (as required by U.S. law) that the disposal would
not violate international law. It focused primarily on the duty laid down in Art. 2 of
the Convention on the High Seas to have reasonable regard for the interests of other
states in exercising freedom of the seas. See Hearings on Dumping of Nerve Gas Rockets
in the Ocean before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. 65 (1970).
45 Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor
Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 21, at 8, U.N. Doe.
A/8021 (1970).
-6 See Hearings, op. cit. note 39 above, at 51-52.
47 See Council on Environmental Quality, op. cit. note 40 above, at 12-15. The oceans
have the capacity to absorb some municipal and industrial waste without harm. Thus the
issue is not whether these wastes may be discharged, but whether they may be discharged in such a manner as to risk overtaxing the absorptive capacity in any given
ocean area.
4" H. R. 9727, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., had passed both Houses of Congress in somewhat
different forms. See 117 Cong. Rec. H 8225-55, S 19629-55 (daily ed., Sept. 9, Nov.
24, 1971). The legislation also curbs U. S. disposal of high-level radioactive wastes and
ecologically harmful warfare agents. Rising international expectations are reflected in
the call by Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark and Iceland for an end to disposal of
harmful chemical and industrial waste in international waters. They have announced
plans to enact legislation to that effect, and Sweden has now done so. See The Times
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dumping convention that would require parties to prohibit transportation of
all material for ocean dumping unless a permit is obtained from a national
agency applying environmental standards set forth in the convention. 0 U.S.
practice therefore does not run counter to expectations of restraint when
large-scale environmental consequences are at stake, and is turning toward
an approach which, in the words of a U.S. official, is "aimed at terminating
all dumping not clearly demonstrated to be safe." 50
Oil tankers provide yet another means involving the United States by
which ocean disposal of pollutants occurs. "Super tanker" pose ocean
environmental challenges not only from the danger of shipwreck but also
from discharge of oil in normal operations. 1 International preventive
practice is developing around the nucleus of the International Convention
for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil. 5 2 The convention prohibits discharges of oil or oily mixtures, subject to exceptions for reasonable discharges under designated conditions. It provides some standards
as to quantity and location of permissible discharges, 3 but sets forth only
in very general terms the means by which discharges are to be avoided., 4
Yet specific precautions for the control of discharges are evolving in practice. In particular, most tanker operators, acting with the approval of
the major maritime states, have adopted the "load on top" system to retain
(London), April 28, 1971, at 1, col. 2; Washington Post, Nov. 13, 1971, at A4, col. 8.
The Government of The Netherlands has responded to international protests by instructing a Dutch firm to abandon its plan to dump 600 tons of chemical waste in the North
Atlantic. See The Times (London), July 23, 1971, at 1, col. 2.
49 See draft Regulation of Transportation for Ocean Dumping Convention Arts. I,
II, 10 Int. Legal Materials 1021 (1971).
50 Statement of William Ruckelshaus, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency,
in Hearings, op. cit. note 39 above, at 265. To the same effect, see Dept. of State
Position Paper, in Hearings on Ocean Dumping of Waste Materials before Subcommittees
of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 115,
116 (1971). The U.S. Government's Committee on International Environmental Affairs
has taken the view that any ocean disposal of wastes which "threatens life or directly
damages property violates international law." Dept. of State, Suggestions Developed
Within the U.S. Government for Consideration by the Secretary General of the 1972
U.N. Conference on Human Environment 59 (1971).
51
For a concise discussion of the challenge, see Study of Critical Environmental
Problems, Man's Impact on the Global Environment 139-143 (report of M.I.T.-sponsorcd
study group, 1970).
52May 12, 1954, (1961)
3 U.S.T. 2989, T.LA.S. No. 4900, 327 U.N.T.S. 3, as
amended April 11, 1962, (1966) 2 U.S.T. 1523, T.I.A.S. No. 6109, and Oct. 21, 1969,
9 Int. Legal Materials 1 (1970). The 1969 amendments are not yet in force. Cf. International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, Nov. 29, 1969, 64 A.J.I.L. 471 (1970), 9 Int. Legal Materials 25 (1970);
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 29, 1969,
64 A.J.I.L. 481 (1970), 9 Int. Legal Materials 45 (1970).
53 Under the 1969 amendments tankers could discharge oil or oily mixtures only beyond 50 miles from land, and then only in designated quantities which are thought
not to cause persistent pollution. See 9 Int. Legal Materials 1, 4 (1970); IMCO Bulletin No. 13, at 7, 9 (1970). The United States has ratified the 1969 amendments.
See 65 Dept. of State Bulletin 575-576 (1971).
54See Arts. VI and VIII.
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on board oil washed from tanks in the cleaning process. 5 Oily mixtures
from ballasting and washing cargo tanks are collected in special tanks,
where the oil is allowed to separate from the water. The water is discharged, but the oil is retained and fresh crude oil is loaded on top of it.
The residues and the fresh oil are eventually discharged at the refinery.56
Such practice, against a backdrop of a multilateral convention providing
general environmental standards, would appear to justify expectations
regarding the conduct of all flag states parties to the convention, and
may even represent a sufficient consensus on the existence of a norm to
bind non-parties. The binding effect stems from a broader normative
principle embodied in the convention-that of avoiding discharge of oil

"

-which has been given a specific application through widely adopted
practice. In view of the high visibility of the problem and of the measures
taken, and the absence of protests, a binding norm could be established
in a relatively short time.
3. The Ocean Floor
Ocean floor operations have consisted primarily of oil exploration and
extraction. Until the Santa Barbara blowout, the U.S. Government appears not to have faced squarely the dangers to the marine environment
involved in ocean bed oil exploitation5 s The result was an oil spill which
caused significant ocean pollution. 5
The Santa Barbara incident has influenced new Federal standards and
procedures to prevent ocean pollution from off-shore drilling. More
stringent requirements for pre-drilling geological reports have been promulgated,6 as have regulations intensifying standards for drilling pror- See Royal Conm'n. on Environmental Pollution, op. cit. note 42 above, at 26;

IMCO Bulletin No. 13, at 7-8. The "load on top" system, though widely recognized as
an effective and desirable anti-pollution measure, may be in technical contravention of
the convention. See 1IMCO Bulletin No. 13, at 8. It would not contravene the convention once the 1969 amendments come into force, nor is it likely to be considered by any
party to involve a substantive present violation. On the contrary, as argued in the text,
it may well be mandatory for parties to the convention.
6 NATO members have taken a further step by agreeing to achieve by 1975 "the
63 Dept.
elimination of intentional discharges of oil and oily wastes into the sea.
of State Bulletin 669 (1970).
57 Also relevant is the Convention on the High Seas, Art. 24, loc. cit. note 11 above,
which calls on member states to "draw up regulations to prevent pollution of the seas by
the discharge of oil by ships .. ." This is arguably a statement of customary law. See
note 37 above.
1-1s
See Baldwin. "The Santa Barbara Oil Spill," 42 Colo. Law Rev. 33 (1970). The
Federal Government issues leases for oil explorations beyond three miles from shore,
under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, loc. cit. note 11 above. The Act authorizes issuance of regulations "to provide for the prevention of waste and conservation of
the natural resources of the outer Continental Shelf.. ." Ibid. §1334(a) (1).
9 See Baldwin, loc. cit. note 58 above, at 52-53. At least two previous blowouts from
wells in the United States' continental shelf resulted in significant pollution. See Hearings on S. 7 and S. 544 before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Public
Works, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 3, at 811 (1969).
41 See 30 C.F.R. §§250.34, 250.91 (1971).
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cedures and equipment to prevent blowouts.61 Tightened pre-leasing
environmental evaluation procedures have been adopted. 2 Although it is
too early to tell whether these measures will be fully adequate to prevent
ocean damage from oil leasing activities, they are a significant step in that
direction. They embody a governmental policy to restrain freedom of
action in seabed areas under effective U.S. control, taken despite economic
counterpressures within the United States. 3
The environmental interests directly affected are primarily those of the
United States, since the immediate damage has been confined largely to
the U.S. coastline and coastal waters. This does not, however, deprive
the response of significance to the evolution of international norms. In
part the international significance is found in the context of the Geneva
Conventions discussed, below. But the response also has precedential
value if future questions arise concerning U.S. regulation of seabed activities which are subject to its control, and which pose more direct environmental challenges to the interests of other states. It would be difficult
to argue in such a case that lesser standards are appropriate.0 4
The United States is a party to several multilateral treaties which require
that account be taken of environmental considerations in seabed operations. Article 5(1) of the Convention on the Continental Shelf may have
been violated by United States failure to adopt safeguards adequate to
prevent the Santa Barbara incident. It provides that: "The exploration
of the continental shelf and the exploitation of its natural resources must
not result in any unjustifiable interference with navigation, fishing or the
conservation of the living resources of the sea. .. : 0" The language is
couched in mandatory terms, and may reflect a pre-existing norm."0
It is probable that the Santa Barbara spill involved "interference with
... the conservation of the living resources of the sea," within the meaning of Article 5(1).07 The major question is whether such interference is
6130 C.F.R. §250A1 (1971).
62 43 C.F.R. §3301.4 (1971). Moreover, the lessee is now subject to potential liability
for cleaning-up expenses. See Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, 33 U.S.C.A.
§1161(f) (3) (1970); 30 C.F.R. §250.43(b) (1971).
63 Baldwin, oc. cit. note 58 above, at 59-60. The 1970 Gulf of Mexico oil discharges
resulted from ventures in operation when the measures were adopted. See, generally,
Nanda and Stiles, "Offshore Oil Spills: An Evaluation of Recent United States Responses," 7 San Diego Law Rev. 519, 534-536 (1970).
64 Cf. Lester, "River Pollution in International Law," 57 A.J.I.L. 828, 852 (1963).
05 Loc. cit. note 11 above.
66 In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, oc. cit. note 6 above, at 39, the I.C.J.,
referring inter alia to Art. 5(1), said that the ". . . general obligation not unjustifiably
to interfere with freedom of navigation, fishing, and so on" was received customary law.
The conservation provision of Art. 5(1) would presumably be included within the
phrase "and so on," though the Court may not have given that its considered judgment.
Cf. 7Baxter, "Treaties and Custom," Zoc. cit. note 37 above, at 48-49.
6 The primary conservation thrust of Art. 5(1) is the protection of fish stocks. See
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SR.378, 1956 I.L.C. Yearbook (I) 272, 277. There was very little
direct fish-kill, if any, from the Santa Barbara incident, though over 1,000 sea birds were
killed and the danger of long-term accumulation of hydrocarbons in the aquatic food
chain was greatly increased. See Baldwin, loc. cit. note 58 above, at 36-37; Study of
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"unjustifiable." The terms of the convention, buttressed by the travaux,
make it clear that no absolute duty of non-interference was intended.6 8
However, the International Law Commission stated the duty rather strictly:
"With regard to the conservation of the living resources of the sea, everything possible should be done to prevent damage by exploitation of the
subsoil. .. " 69 At the very least, it would seem "unjustifiable" to fail
to adopt safeguards which take full account of the magnitude of potential

harm if a reasonably foreseeable accident occurs, the availability of de%ices or techniques capable of preventing mishap, and the geological or
other physical characteristics of the area.
Article 5(7) of the Convention on the Continental Shelf obligates the
coastal state to undertake, in safety zones established around devices on
the shelf, "all appropriate measures" for the protection of the living resources of the sea from harmful agents. Here again the extent of the
duty is not well defined. It has been suggested that this has simply had
the effect of requiring operators to observe "good oil industry practice"

and to provide equipment to stem the flow if a blowout occurs.7 0 It is
probable, however, that as a result of Santa Barbara and of the conse-

quent measures adopted by the United States, expectations are being
formed regarding more stringent standards of prevention. As in the case
of Article 5(1), however, precise mandatory standards do not yet exist.71
Article 24 of the Convention on the High Seas provides that "Every
State shall draw up regulations to prevent pollution of the seas," not only
by the discharge of oil from ships or pipelines, but also "resulting from
the exploitation or exploration of the seabed and its subsoil. . .

."

As

elsewhere in the High Seas Convention, the meaning of "pollution" is
left unclear.'2 The contemplated regulations need not prohibit the introduction into the sea of all pollutants, in the absence of known or
Critical Environmental Problems, op. cit. note 51 above. The terms of Art. 5(1) are
broad enough to encompass these effects. The travaux, cited above, do not rule out
extension beyond direct fish-kills. It would be anomalous to construe Art. 5(1) to
apply to fish-kills but not to the accumulation in edible fish of substances dangerous to
man.
68 Art. 5(1) also refers to non-interference with scientific research, omitting the word
"unjustifiable." An attempt in the drafting stage to strike the word from the "navigation, fishing or conservation" provision was rejected. See 6 U.N. Conf. on the Law of
the Sea 84-85, 90, U.N. Doe. A/CONF.13/42 (1958). See also ibid. 82, 88; I.L.C.
Report, U.N. Doe. A/3159, 1956 I.L.C. Yearbook (H) 253, 299.
9 Ibid.
70 Hardy, loc. cit. note 2 above, at 331.
71 The travaux relating to Art. 5(7) offer little help, since it was not in the I.L.C. draft.
72 The Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission of UNESCO has proposed a
definition of marine pollution which could serve as a guide to interpretation, mutatiq
mutandis, in the absence of a more authoritative definition: "Introduction by man,
directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the marine environment (including
estuaries) resulting in such deleterious effects as harm to living resources, hazard to
human health, hindrance to marine activities including fishing, impairing the quality
for use of sea water and reduction of amenities." Report on Long-Term and Expanded
Programme of Oceanographic Research, U.N. Doc. A/7750, at 25 (1969). Cf. Report
by the World Health Organization, Environmental Pollution and Its Control, U.N. Doc.

E/4457, at 2 (1968).
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scientifically postulated damage. To do so would be effectively to prohibit all seabed activities. 73 Some affirmative action is required, however, to prevent damage from ocean pollution. Protection would not be
limited to the "living resources of the sea," as that phrase is used in the
Convention on the Continental Shelf.74 In a broad sense, the High Seas
Convention reflects a community expectation that steps will be taken, in
advance of proven damage, to prevent harm by pollution to man's interest
in the marine environment.
Significant also is the General Assembly's 1970 Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil
Thereof, beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction.75 Regarding protection of the marine environment, it provides that:
With respect to activities in the [seabed] area and acting in conformity with the international regime to be established, States shall
adoption
for and shall
take
appropriate measures
andtheprocedures
standards in
rules,co-operate
of international
and implementation
for, inter aia: (a) The prevention of pollution and contamination,
and other hazards to the marine environment, including the coastline,

renatural enof the marine
balance of
and conservation
the ecological
protection
(b) The with
vironment;
and of interference
fauna
and
flora
the
to
damage
of
prevention
sources of the area and
of the marine environment.
The Declaration is based on the precept that there is an area of the seabed
terms, and was adopted
that is res comrmunis.70 It is couched in mandatory
the creation of an international

without formal dissent. It looks toward
regime, but enunciates a duty to take anti-pollution and conservation measures without conditioning the duty entirely on the acts of such an eventual
regime. Taken as a whole it reads like a constitutional document, comwereof totheconsider
one law
exceptions. 7 7 Evenonif the
plete with careftUy drawnexisting
sea, it
conventions
it without regard to the
achieved
78
character
"quasi-legislative"
a
have
to
might well be found
7
through the familiar legislative process of bargaining and compromise
f Report of the Secretary General, lo. cit. note 5 above, at 112.
See

Compare note

72 above.
4e I.L.C. Report,i

e. cit. note 68 above, at 286.
ta is Res. 2749, par. 11, o.s t. note 4 above, adopted by a vote of 108 to none,
with 14 abstentions. The U.S. voted in favor. See 64 Dept. of State Bulletin 155
(1971).

u G.A. Res. .749, passim and especially par. 1.
p7 It is considerably more legislative in tone than, for example, the Declaration of
Legal Principles Governing the Acitines of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space, G.A. Res. 162., 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. 15, at 15, U.N. Do. A/5515 (1963); 58
A.J.I.L. 477 (1964).
m t Falk, "On the Quasi-Legislative Competence of the General Assembly," 60

D'Amato, "On Consensus," 8 Canadian Yr. Bk. Int. Law 104,
A.J.I.L. 782 (1966). Cf.
113-115 (1970). For discussion of the Declaration in the context of the existing conventions on the law of the sea, see text at note 82 below.
7
See remarks by the Australian representative to the General Assembly's First Committee, U.N. Doc. A/C.lPV.1777, at 26 (1970).
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Given these circumstances, it seems clear that the Declaration-or, more
accurately, the shared values it embodies-will influence the behavior of
nations even before the creation of any international seabed regime, and
will do so with greater force than that of a mere recommendation." This
is not to assert that it provides clear rules to be applied to all cases. For
example, it is expressly applicable only to the ill-defined area "beyond
the limits of national jurisdiction," and it does not define such key terms
as "pollution," "hazards" and "marine environment."

But its restriction to

areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction is relevant primarily to the
non-conservation provisions, such as those concerning the sharing of benefits from seabed exploitation. Moreover, conservation terms in the Declaration such as "ecological balance of the marine environment" have
sufficient meaning to provide a standard for assertions of impermissibility
in certain instances, as, for example, when scientific opinion indicates that
given underwater activities are likely to interfere with the aquatic food
chain. It is reasonable, therefore, to view the conservation provisions as
an expression of community expectation that underwater activities, including those on the continental shelf, will be conducted with a genuine regard
for at least those resources that are clearly part of the marine environment. 81
It is important also to consider the Declaration in light of the conventions on the law of the sea. The term "appropriate measures" is the same
as that used in Article 5(7) of the Convention on the Continental Shelf.8 2
The reference to prevention of pollution in the seabed area meshes with
Article 24 of the Convention on the High Seas.8 3 The Declaration, however, encompasses a broader range of environmental interests to be protected. Its significance to the conventions appears to lie not primarily
as an aid to their interpretation, but as a buttress to the argument that
their underwater conservation provisions now reflect custom, whether or
not they originally did, and however general the custom may be. The
60 This is probable despite the view voiced by some representatives that the Declaration would not have binding legal effect. See U.N. Does. A/C.I/PV.1777, at 27 (Australia); A/C.1/PV.1779, at 7 (Canada); ibid. 39-40 (Italy); A/C.1/PV.1788, at 28
(Belgium). Cf. statement by Mr. Amerasinghe, Chairman of the Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed, U.N. Doe. A/PV.1933, at 99-100 (1970). Such views
are accurate in the sense that the Declaration does not ipso facto become law upon
adoption. Its legal effect is more subtle, but is likely to be felt even in the face of
advance disclaimers. Cf. Schachter, "The Relation of Law, Politics and Action in the
United Nations," 109 Hague Academy, Recueil des Cours 165, 181-184 (1963); Higgins, "The United Nations and Lawmaking: The Political Organs," 64 A.J.I.L. (Proceedings) at 37, 40-42 (1970).
s1 As a matter of common understanding, the marine environment would include the
waters of the high seas and the seabeds. The Declaration provides that it also includes
the coastline.
82 See text at note 70 above. The Declaration may also provide a partial gauge of
what is required to avoid "unjustifiable interference" with conservation, under Art. 5(1)
of that convention. See text at note 65 above. The Declaration is relevant to the
evaluation of conduct under the Continenal Shelf Convention even though it asserts its
coverage only for the seabed "beyond the limits of national jurisdiction." See text following note 80 above.
83 See text preceding note 72 above.
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Declaration and the conventions are in fact synergistic, embodying similar
values concerning environmental preservation, each strengthening the prescriptive authority of the others vis-h-vis all members of the world community.
The United States moved from participant to initiator in multinational
seabed environmental practice with its proposal of detailed draft seabed
treaty provisions concerning, inter alia, preservation of the marine environment. 84 The draft provisions warn that they do not necessarily represent the definitive views of the government. They are nevertheless noteworthy for their forthright statement of a duty to conduct all activities
"with strict and adequate safeguards for the protection of

...

the marine

environment" 85 and for their contemplation of international machinery to
formulate and prescribe specific rules designed to avoid marine damage.6
The statement of the duty to conduct seabed activities with "strict and
adequate safeguards" will inevitably play a part in the formulation of
community assertions about permissible United States conduct (and of
reciprocal United States assertions) before the advent of a convention on
the subject. As in the case of all the seabed environmental measures we
have considered, recognition of even such a general duty serves not only
to counter any assertion of a right based on freedom of the seas to proceed without regard to environmental considerations, but also reinforces
the normative expectation that seabed activities will not be undertaken at
all without safeguards effective under the circumstances to prevent significant, reasonably foreseeable harm to the marine environment.
The United States draft treaty provisions and the U.N. Declaration are,
of course, threads in a fabric of rapidly growing international concern
over the effect of seabed activities on the marine environment. Additional
manifestations involving the United States include consideration of the
problem by the Legal Subcommittee of the U.N. Committee on Peaceful
Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor; 8T studies by the U.N. Secretariat
on seabed pollution problems, including the legal aspects; 88 proposed consideration by the 1973 Conference on the Law of the Sea of ". . . the
preservation of the marine environment (including . . . the question of
84 See Draft of United Nations Convention on the International Seabed Area, 25 U.N.
GAOR Supp. 21, Annex V, U.N. Doc. A/8021 (1970). Compare Draft Ocean Space
Treaty (Malta), Arts. 58, 60, 72, 74, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/53 (1971).
85 U.S. Draft Art. 9. See also Draft Art. 22. "Marine environment" is not defined,
an omission noted with some concern in Auburn, "The International Seabed Area," 20
Int. and Comp. Law Q. 173, 189 (1971). But see note 81 above.
86U.S. Draft Arts. 23, 68(1) (d) and (e).
8
See, e.g., the Committee's Reports, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. 22, at 31, U.N. Doc.
A/7622 (1969); 1970 Report, loc. cit. note 45 above, at 7-11; Report of Subcommittee
II op. cit. note 28 above.
88 See, e.g., Reports of the Secretary General: Study on International Machinery,
loc. cit. note 5 above; The Sea: Prevention and Control of Marine Pollution, U.N. Doc.
E/5003 (1971); Marine Pollution and Other Hazardous and Harmful Effects ... , U.N.
Doc. A/7924 (1970); Study on the Question of Establishing in Due Time Appropriate
International Machinery . ,24
2 U.N. GAOR Supp. 22, Annex II, U.N. Doc. A/7622
(1969).
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..... ;89 sponsorship by the Intergovernmental Maritime

Consultative Organization of a conference on marine pollution in 1973,
and IMCO's exhortation to member states to apply effective control measures for preventing marine pollution; "' and recognition of the pollutionavoidance aspect of the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of
Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed
and Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof. 91
With increasing manifestations of concern come more stringent community expectations as to what interference is "justifiable" and what measures
are "appropriate" under existing conventions. Their application would not
necessarily be limited to oil-drilling activities. The cumulative effect of
the practice and pronouncements reviewed above seems sufficient to generate expectations that protective measures will be adequate to prevent
harmful consequences which may reasonably be anticipated even though
they may not be fully understood. Such expectations may extend to
conduct in other shared environments when the risk is comparable to that
perceived in connection with seabed activities.
4. Outer Space
In 1960 the United States announced its intention to place 350 million
tiny needles in a short-lived orbit to determine their utility as relayers of
military and other communications. 9 2 Despite opposition from such groups
as the International Scientific Radio Union and the International Astronomical Union, the United States went ahead with the experiment. After
an abortive first try, and after further international protests, orbit was
achieved in 1963.91 The protests appear to have been based in part on
the assertion of a duty not to interfere with the activities of other states.94
Although the "space needles" apparently produced no lasting detrimental
effect, the scientific community called for more thorough evaluation internationally before similar experiments were undertaken. 95 The United
States indicated its willingness to enter into "appropriate international
consultations before proceeding with a space activity if it had reason to
believe that its activity may create a significant risk of harm."96 The
so G.A. Res. 2750C, 25 U.N. CAOR Supp. 28, at 26, U.N. Doe. A/8028 (1970).

90 See I.M.C.O. Res. A.176(VI), I.M.C.O. Assembly Resolutions and Other Decisions

124-25 (1969). For further discussion of proposed international action on marine pollution, see Hardy, oc. cit. note 2 above, at 337-344.
91 See U.N. Doe. A/AC.138/SR.12, at 4 (1969) (remarks of the Soviet representative
to the Seabed Committee). The treaty is not yet in force.
92 See S. Doe. No. 56, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 390, 396 (1965); R. Gardner, In Pursuit
of World Order 216 (rev. ed., 1966).
93S. Doe. No. 56, loc. cit. See G. CAI, Space Law 146-147 (1969); Mouton, "The
Impact of Science on International Law," 119 Hague Academy, Recueil des Cours 183,
238 (1966).
994Se Darwin, "The Outer Space Treaty," 42 Brit. Yr. Bk. Int. Law 278, 281 (1967).
95 For the formal statement of concern by the international scientific community, see
Statement on Belts of Orbiting Dipoles . . .in S. Doc. No. 56, op. cit. note 92 above,
at 396-397.
96 Gardner. "Outer Space: Problems of Law and Power," 49 Dept. of State Bulletin
367, 369 (1963). Cf. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Ex-
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space needles experiment has not been repeated. More significantly, the
United States has abandoned a proposal to orbit a "space mirror," even
though the National Research Council's Space Science Board found no
overwhelming evidence that damage would result.97 As in the case of the
space needles, there appears to have been a military purpose for the experiment, this time involving the illumination of certain areas on the earth.
The international scientific community feared that the reflection of sunlight could influence patterns of life on earth.,,
A particularly serious challenge to the space environment has occurred
in connection with high altitude nuclear explosions. The Starfish explosion by the United States in 1962 introduced a massive dose of electrons
into a stable portion of the Van Allen magnetic belt. The result has been
long-term disruption of natural phenomena and interference with scientific
observations. This occurred despite advance assurances from American
scientists that there would be no lasting influence on the earth's environment.9° International response was vigorous, reflecting the conviction of
many states '%. . that no interference with the natural state of the [outer
space] environment in the name of scientific investigation ... is tolerable
even if no specific damage can be shown." 00 Nuclear explosions in space,
of course, are now proscribed, at least among parties to the partial Test
Ban Treaty. 10 '
Concern about possible detrimental environmental effects of outer space
activities has also focused on man's space explorations. The 1967 Outer
Space Treaty contains a broad standard of environmental conduct:
States Parties to the Treaty shall pursue studies of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, and conduct exploration
of them so as to avoid their harmful contamination and also adverse
changes in the environment of the Earth resulting from the introduction of extra-ten-estrial matter and,
10 2 where necessary, shall adopt
appropriate measures for this purpose.
ploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan.
27, 1967, Art. IX, (1967) 3 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 61 AJ.I.L. 644 (1967)
(parties have a duty to consult if they have reason to believe that their planned space
activities "would cause potentially harmful interference with activities of other States
Parties in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space . . ."). The treaty language
is based on G.A. Res. 1962, par. 6, loc. cit. note 77 above, which was prompted in part
by international reaction to the U.S. "space needles" experiment. See S. H. Lay and
H. f. Taubenfeld, The Law Relating to Activities of Man in Space 189 (1970).
97See R. and H. J.Taubenfeld, The International Implications of Weather Modification Activities 50 (unpublished study for the Dept. of State Office of External Research,

1968).
91See Lovell, "The Pollution of Space," 79 The Listener 828, 830 (1968).
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objections to the space needles experiment were primarily concerned with the effect on
astronomy. Ibid. 829.
09 Ibid. 829-830.
100 R. and H. J. Taubenfeld, "Some International Implications of Weather Modification
Activities," 23 Int. Organization 808, 828 (1969).
101 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
under Water, Art. I. Loc. cit. note 28 above.
102 Lao. cit. note 96 above.
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As in the case of explicitly formulated community standards concerning
operative language is quite general. But it
the ocean environment, the
03
is not devoid of meaning
Two distinct environmental hazards are contemplated by the treaty:
harmful contamination of outer space, including celestial bodies, and adverse changes in the environment of the earth.10 - Scientific attention has

been directed to the former for some time. In 1964 a Consultative Group
of the Committee on Space Research of the International Council of Scientific Unions (COSPAR) recommended that, for Mars and other planets
v,here there is a chance that terrestrial life might be sustained, measures
should be taken to reduce the probability of a single viable organism being
aboard a landing craft to less than one in 10,000. For unsterilized fly-by
the probability recommended was three in 100,000.105 Conditions on the
moon were thought sufficienfly harsh to exclude the possibility of biological contamination of the surface, and less rigorous (as well as less specific)
standards were thus recommended. 0 6 In 1966 COSPAR again considered
these questions. It retained its commitment to the avoidance of planetary
contamination, but refrained from enunciating standards such as those set
forth by the Consultative Group in 1964. The rationale was that decisions on how to avoid contamination were best left to the nations involved.1 " " The inference has consequently been drawn that the Outer
Space Treaty does not incorporate the 1964 standards.10s Such a conclusion seems inescapable.
Even though it may not be possible to postulate specific rules prescribed
by the treaty, broadly recognizable standards seem to be evolving from
U.S. practice. Thus it appears that the United States has accepted roughly
the 1964 COSPAR standards for explorations in the vicinity of Mars, the
planet most likely to sustain terrestrial life. 0 9 U.S. scientists made efforts
before the first lunar landing to reduce the contamination effects of the
landing, but there was some inevitable contamination from rocket exhaust
and cabin leakage."10 This probably was not "harmful contamination"
0R,
Its significance with respect to U.S. lunar and interplanetary probes is explored
below. In addition, it has been argued that the language would prohibit a repetition
of the space needles experiment. See C. GA1, op. cit. note 93 above, at 154.
104 See, generally, Brooks, "Legal Aspects of the Lunar Landings," 4 Int. Lawyer 415,

420-424 (1970); M. McDougal, H. Lasswell and I. Vlasic, op. cit. note 6 above, at
534-536.
10 1 See Report of COSPAR Consultative Group on the Potentially Harmful Effects of
Space Experiments, U.N. Doe. A/AC.105/20, Annex II at 14-15 (1964); Brooks, Zoo.
cit. note 104 above, at 421.
10 8 See Report of COSPAR Consultative Group, op. cit. at 15-16.
10T See Brooks, loc. cit. note 104 above, at 421.
MOIbd 422.
119 See Lovel], 'The Dangers of Polluting the Planets," The Times (London), Feb. 10,
1969, at 9, col. 7; Johnson, "Pollution and Contamination in Space," in Law and Politics
in Space 37, 45-46 (M. Cohen ed., 1964).
110 See Brooks, loc. cit. note 104 above, at 422.
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within the meaning of the treaty,11 nor is it likely that contamination from
more recent U.S. lunar expeditions has been "harmful."
United States practice therefore suggests that more stringent standards
are applicable to exploration of planets with life-sustaining potentialities
than to more hostile bodies such as the moon. It is doubtful that the 1964
COSPAR standards have attained normative status through U.S. practice, 112
but it does appear that the United States recognizes the need-and perhaps the duty-for rigorous sterilization procedures when the risk of
biological contamination is substantial.
Relatively strenuous efforts were made to avoid adverse consequences
for the earth's environment from the return of the first Apollo lunar missions. These efforts took the form of quarantine and testing procedures
for astronauts and for the inanimate materials brought back with them.
Nevertheless, some doubts about their adequacy were raised. It was
questioned whether enough could be learned during a 21-day quarantine,
and whether a sufficient degree of decontamination could be achieved, to
insure against subtle and difficult-to-diagnose effects on complex biologicalecological earth systems. 13 Doubts have also been expressed about the
propriety of venting command modules during descent toward earth, and
about the manner of opening the hatch after splash-down.114 United States
decision-makers have not regarded these doubts as overriding. They have
in fact determined that tests from Apollo missions have demonstrated the
harmlessness of lunar materials, justifying discontinuance of the quarantine
procedure.1 5 It does not appear that there have been protests from foreign governments on any of these points.110
U.S. practice with respect to space activities does not extend to recognition of a requirement of abstention from all potentially harmful procedures until harmlessness is conclusively demonstrated. Nevertheless, the
United States has observed a very considerable degree of caution in recent
years. When the environmental risk has appeared greatly to outweigh
the potential benefit, and has been brought home by forceful international
"I1The meaning of "harmful" has to be judged by reference to the uses to which the
moon is to be put. See Brooks, loo. cit. These are not fully known as yet. One such
use might be as a platform for astronomy, with which lingering exhaust gases could
interfere. It is highly unlikely, however, that gases from lunar operations to date could
affect such an eventual use.
112 Soviet space probes apparently have not been conducted in accordance with the
1964 COSPAR standards. See Lovell, loc. cit. note 109 above, col. 6. Soviet authorities,
however, have shown an awareness of the need to avoid space contamination. See G.
G61, op. cit. note 93 above, at 151; S.H. Lay and H. J. Taubenfeld, op. cit.
note 96
above, at 189, note 43; U.S.S.R. Draft Treaty Concerning the Moon, Art. IV, U.N. Doe.
A/C.I/L.568 (1971).
1i3 Alexander, 'Tossible Contamination of Earth by Lunar or Martian Life," 222
Nature 432 (1969).
114 See Brooks, loc. cit. note 104 above, at 423.
115 See New York Times, April 29, 1971, at 43, col. 1. No viable organisms have been
found in lunar materials. See Lunar Sample Preliminary Examination Team, "Preliminary Examination of Lunar Samples from Apollo 14," 173 Science 681, 691 (1971).
116 Letter from Richard H. Campbell, Otfce of Space, Atmospheric and Marine
Science Affairs, U.S. Department of State, to the author, June 3, 1971.
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protests, as in the case of further high-altitude nuclear explosions or the
proposed space mirror experiment, the United States has ultimately abstained. Moreover, its announcement in the aftermath of the space needles
incident of an intention to consult internationally in advance, if it has
7
reason to believe that its activity "may" create a significant risk of harm,"1
is an acknowledgment of a restraint that could enable non-participant
states to influence the outcome by stressing their apprehension of environmental risks which might otherwise be brushed aside.-"' Recognition of
the desirability of advance international consultations in the face of only
a possibility that a significant risk will be created also tends to establish
that such consultations are measures "appropriate" for avoidance of harmful contamination or adverse environmental change under the Outer Space
Treaty.
5. Weather Modification and Analogous Practice
Weather modification may result either from a deliberate attempt to
change the weather (for example, by seeding clouds or by changing storm
tracks) or inadvertently from activities conducted for other purposes (for
example, the "greenhouse effect" of urbanization and industrialization).
The discussion below wvill concentrate on deliberate weather modification
and on inadvertent modification only insofar as it stems from the operation
of jet aircraft.
Deliberate weather modification has aroused scientific concern focusing
on the possible effects beyond the immediate geographic area in which
modification is desired. The problem arises because of the complex (and
not wholly understood) interaction among atmospheric processes which
may often preclude effective confinement of atmospheric change to the
intended area." 9 The more ambitious the weather modification attempt,
the less predictable and more potentially serious are the unintended
effects." ° They may range from changes in immediate precipitation to
relatively long-term climatic changes."'2
1' See text at note 96 above. Cf. statement of the U.S. Secretary of State, in the
text at note 145 below.
11s The announced criterion for consultations is broader than that in the outer space
treaty. It is questionable whether the United States did much more than notify other
states of its intention in advance of the space needles experiment. See E. Skolnikoff,
Science, Technology, and American Foreign Policy 85-87 (1967). The announced
willingness to consult presumably was intended as an assurance that something more
than notification could thereafter be expected in comparable circumstances, though discretion was retained to determine whether an activity may create a significant risk.
219 For non-technical descriptions of the pertinent atmospheric properties, see G.
Trewartha, An Introduction to Climate 16-35 (4th ed., 1968); Study of Critical Environnental Problems, op. cit. note 51 above, at 41-46.
120 See generally H. Lamb, The Changing Climate 154-156 (1966); National Science
Foundation, Weather and Climate Modification 114 (1966); Roberts, 'he State of the
Art in Weather Modification," in Weather Modification and the Law 1, 16 (H. Taubenfeld ed., 1968); Wexler, "Modifying Weather on a Large Scale," 128 Science 1059,
1061-1063 (1958).
121 There is a distinction behveen weather modification and climate modification.
The latter involves an attempt to change long-term climatic conditions. See Wycoff,
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The U.S. Department of State has acknowledged the need to abstain
from intentional weather modification activities that might affect the
weather of other countries, in the absence of advance agreements with
them.22 The announced rationale reflects the raison cd'tre for virtually
any international norm limiting freedom of state action: "We won't want
other nations modifying our weather, and so we will certainly have to accept some restraints on our freedom to modify theirs." 23 The harmony
with the rationale for the creation and observance of custom does not establish that the norm exists. But it does suggest that the United States
has not been exercising restraint entirely gratuitously, and thus lends normative significance to U.S. practice.
United States practice concerning deliberate weather modification has
been consistent with a norm of restraint. Standards set for hurricane seeding projects take into account the interests of Caribbean and Atlantic
islands, and reflect an understanding that hurricane seeding may produce
unpredictable results.124 Less ambitious modification projects sponsored
by the Government have also carefully avoided any significant effects on
neighboring countries. 25' The consistent practice, in light of the express
recognition of mutual self-interest, suggests that a norm of restraint either
exists or is in the process of formation. At the root of the norm is the
uncertainty of1 the consequences, balanced against the expected utility of
2
the activity.
United States practice involving the use of jet aircraft has not been
quite so circumspect. Tentative results from existing studies indicate that
there may be some increase in cirrus (ice crystal) clouds in heavily
traveled air lanes.127 This could be the consequence of injections of water
vapor from jet exhaust in the upper troposphere, where relative humidity
is such that cloud formation is likely to result from moisture increases. 28
Cirrus clouds reflect both incoming solar radiation and outgoing earth
radiation. They can therefore affect climate through changes in the at"Evaluation of the State of the Art," in Human Dimensions of Weather Modification 27,
37 (W. Sewell ed., 1966).
122 Department of State letter to Senator Magnuson, in Hearings on S.23 and S.2916
before the Senate Committee on Commerce, 89th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., Pt. 2, at 321
(1965-1966). Note that the reference is to advance agreements, not simply to consultations.
123 Cleveland, "The Politics of Outer Space," 52 Dept. of State Bulletin 1010 (1965)
(emphasis in original).
124 See Wollan, "Controlling the Potential Hazards of Government-Sponsored Technology," 36 G.W. Law Rev. 1105, 1117-1118 (1968); B. and H. Taubenfeld, loc. oft.
note 100 above, at 811, note 7.
125 See Hearings on S.23 and S.2916, op. cit. note 122 above, Pt. 1, at 237; ibid., Pt.
2, at 405.
126 Cf. M. MeDougal and W. Burke, op. cit. note 27 above, at 792-793, noting the
uncertain r6le of oceans in determining climate, and concluding that intentional interference with climatic conditions "would appear to be one activity which will be regarded
as requiring the explicit agreement among states adversely affected." See also M. McDougal,
H. Lasswell and I. Viasic, op. cit. note 6 above, at 631.
' 2 7 See Study of Critical Environmental Problems, op. cit. note 51 above, at 67.
328 Ibid. 66.
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mospheric heat balance. 12 Although nothing appears to suggest that
current subsonic jet operations have yet had a significant effect on climate,
scientists are concerned about future effects if there is a substantial increase in jet activity.
The United States, of course, is far from the only nation to operate
commercial jet aircraft in the upper troposphere. The widespread international participation negates the existence of a general norm proscribing
this commercial use of advanced technology in the res communis simply
because it may ultimately have unintended and uncertain environmental
side effects.'
This does not mean that all unintended environmental effects of commercial aviation have been ignored. For example, a significant step was
taken by the Federal Aviation Administration in 1970 toward prohibiting
sonic booms for commercial flights over the United States. This was done
at a time when the United States' supersonic transport prototype production was still being funded by the Federal Government and when the
prospect of supersonic operations involving United States territory and
U.S. flag carriers seemed considerably more realistic than it did some
months later. In the view of the F.A.A., "A restriction on sonic boom
producing flights over populated areas is supported at this time by the
inconclusive results of research concerning the effects of the sonic boom
on the surface environment." '31 The "restriction" proposed was actually
a prohibition, dictated by the uncertainty of the environmental effect
of the sonic boom. 32
Significant also is the Congressional refusal to provide further funds
for SST development. The environmental motivations are not as easily
isolated as in the case of measures designed to prohibit sonic booms, but
it is clear that such considerations played a part and that members of the
Congress were fully aware of the international environmental implications
involved in going ahead. It does appear that the risk of climatic change
(possibly global in scope) from sustained SST use in the stratosphere is
substantially greater than from subsonic commercial operations in the
tropospbere."
This was brought out in Congressional committee hear13
ings and was a major issue in the floor debates. 4
1'-0 Ibid. 91-92, 99. Cf. 2 National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council,
Weather and Climate Modification: Problems and Prospects 61 (1966); Report to the
Chief, United States Weather Bureau, Weather and Climate Modification 7 (1965).
An artificial increase in cirrus cloudiness might also stimulate local precipitation. See
Study of Critical Environmental Problems, op. cit., at 100.
13') Compare the use of super-tankers at sea. See text at note 51 above.
13' F. A. A. Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 35 Fed. Reg. 6189-6190 (1970).
132 Other nations have also proposed to ban the sonic boom. See The Times (London), Sept. 15, 1970, at 1, col. 8; New York Times, Feb. 4, 1970, at 86, col. 5. If
enough nations do so, a general principle relating to the boom might arise. Whether
or not this occurs, the proposed U.S. restriction is particularly significant because of the
rationale given for it.
133 See Study of Critical Environmental Problems, op. cit. note 51 above, at 67-74,
100-107. The problem arises largely because the SST would introduce water vapor
and particulate matter into the normally dry and cloudless stratosphere, where stable
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Steps taken by the United States to restrict sonic booms and to halt
governmental funding for the SST are domestic public acts involving
internationally relevant policy. These decisions are consistent with U.S.
practice in the area of intentional weather modification. They are capable of influencing expectations regarding United States use of new technology in the common environment-particularly in an environment not
previously utilized extensively by man-when responsible scientific opinion
is able to point out potentially severe environmental effects, even though
the precise consequences are uncertain.3 5
6. Other Treaty Practice
The Antarctic Treaty prohibits the disposal of radioactive wastes in the
Antarctic area, and foreshadowed the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty by prohibiting nuclear explosions in the area.13 6 It is noteworthy that the prohibition of radioactive waste disposal and of nuclear explosions was inserted to meet the real but unverified environmental concerns of Southern
Hemisphere nations. 137 A norm calling for abstention in a near-virgin
environment was included in response to assertions which lacked a clear
climatic conditions would impede the relatively rapid diffusion which occurs in the
troposphere. The result could be temperature changes, increased cirrus cloudiness, and
climate modification. Moreover, there is concern that SST water vapor and nitric oxides
would decompose some stratospheric ozone, permitting increased solar ultraviolet radiation to reach the earth. See Report to the Secretary of the Interior of the Special Study
Group on Noise and Sonic Boom in Relation to Man 50-52 (1968); Harrison, "Stratospheric Ozone with Added Water Vapor: Influence of High-Altitude Aircraft," 170
Science 734 (1970); Johnston, "Reduction of Stratospheric Ozone by Nitrogen Oxide
Catalysts from Supersonic Transport Exhaust," 173 ibid. 517 (1971); Newell, "Water
Vapour Pollution in the Stratosphere by the Supersonic Transporter?", 226 Nature 70
(1970). But see 2 National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council, op. cit.
note 129 above, at 98-100; Chatham, "Will the SST Change the Weather?", 8 Astronautics & Aeronautics at 8 (Jan. 1970).
134 See, e.g., Hearings on Economic Analysis and the Efficiency of Government before
a Subcommittee of the Joint Economic Committee, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., Pt. 4, at 10001006 (1970); Hearings on Dept. of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations
for 1971 before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess., Pt. 2, at 1480-1486, 1586-1591 (1970); Senate debate, 117 Cong. Ree. S246162, 2636-37, 2702, 3092-97, 3504, 3629-32, 3820-57 passim (daily ed., March 4, 9,
12, 23, 24, 1971).
235 Cf. Virally, loc. cit. note 24 above, at 130.
186 Dec. 1, 1959, Art. V(1), (1961) 1 U.S.T. 794; T.I.A.S. No. 4780; 402 U.N.T.S.
71; 54 A.J.I.L. 477 (1960). The treaty does contain a caveat reserving the rights of
any state under international law regarding the high seas within the Antarctic area. In
view of the recognized restrictions on the right to conduct nuclear tests even before the
Test Ban Treaty (see text at notes 26-27 above), the caveat would have only a limited
effect on the nuclear explosion prohibition. This point is of more than academic importance, since not all parties to the Antarctic Treaty are parties to the Test Ban Treaty.
Cf. Antarctic Treaty, Art. V(2). It is doubtful that there is a right to dispose of radioactive waste in the high seas of the Antarctic area, since other, less sensitive, disposal
sites are available. Cf. text at notes 31-42 above.
237 See H. Taubenfeld, "A Treaty for Antarctica" (International Conciliation No. 531),
at pp. 243, 284-285 (1961).
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showing of present or future environmental harm, but which evidenced a
not wholly unwarranted concern on the part of interested states.
Noteworthy also is Article 25(2) of the Convention on the High Seas. 138
It provides that
All States shall cooperate with the competent international organizations in taking measures for the prevention of pollution of the seas
or air space above, resulting from any activities with radioactive
materials or other harmful agents.
It has been suggested that Article 25(2) provides no more than an admonishment to co-operate. 3 9 But the terms are clearly those of obligation
rather than of admonishment, and this seems to be the general understanding of them.110 Even in the absence of specific measures promulgated
by "competent international organizations," the Secretary General took the
position that the United States' disposal of nerve gas at sea in 1970 was
contrary to its duty to co-operate imposed by Article 25(2).141
Finally, the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of the High Seas imposes a duty on member states
...to adopt, or to co-operate with other States in adopting, such measures for their respective nationals as may be necessary
for the con42
servation of the living resources of the high seas.
This appears to have been directed primarily at the problem of overexploitation rather than pollution,143 but the objective of conservation of
resources is similar to that embodied in the other conventions on the law
of the sea. Each reflects community expectations of restraint sufficient to
avoid impairment of the utility of ocean resources to the community at
large.

HI. SYNTHESIS
The discussion has dealt with a number of instances which provide specific precedents for the normative evaluation of future conduct. It has
also emphasized principles which may be drawn from existing U.S. practice.
It is important to go further in order to identify the extent to which the
precedents and principles may lend order to claims and counterclaims regarding issues for which no direct or closely analogous precedent exists.
The clearest norm-and the most general-evident from U.S. practice
concerns the impermissibility of undertaking new technological activities
in the shared environment without regard for environmental preservation.
138 Loc. cit. note 11 above.
239 M. McDougal and W. Burke, op. cit. note 27 above, at 867.
140 See Schachter and Serwer, loc. cit. note 5 above, at 95, 98, 104.
14' See note 44 above; Brown, loc. cit. note 32 above, at 253-254. It is arguable
also that Art. 25(2) obligates parties to implement the General Assembly's Declaration
of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed, loc. cit. note 4 above, with respect to activities
involving "harmful agents" on the seabed. See text at notes 75-83 above.
242April 29, 1958, Art. 1(2), (1966) 1 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S.

285; 52 A.J.I.L. 851 (1958).
43

See also ibid., Art. 2.

' See I.L.C. Report, U.N. Doc. A/2934, 1955 I.L.C. Yearbook (II) 19, 28-29; 5

U.N. Conf. on the Law of the Sea 10, 98, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/41 (1958).
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U.S. practice since the early years of nuclear weapons testing shows recognition of the need to consider environmental consequences to the res communis and acquiescence in the assertion of a duty to do so. This has sometimes culminated in loosely formulated treaty obligations, but even in the
absence of treaty the cumulative effect has been to create the expectation
that the United States will take environmental hazards into account. As
the awareness of environmental danger has intensified, so have the preventive measures acknowledged by the United States to be appropriate.
The result is an increasing level of international expectation regarding required precautions.
In addition, United States practice concerning space experiments, weather
modification and munitions disposal at sea suggests the evolution of a
duty to consult internationally before carrying out novel activities in the
shared environment. 144 Moreover, the Secretary of State has declared that
... perhaps it is time for the international community to begin moving
toward a consensus that nations have a right to be consulted before
actions are taken which could affect their environment or the international environment at large. This implies, of course, that nations
contemplating such actions would be45 expected to consult in advance
other states which could be affected.1
This statement is noteworthy in several respects: it uses the language of
rights and obligations; it applies not just to the environment of individual
states, but to the environment at large; and it contemplates a duty to consult states which merely "could" be affected. The very suggestion by a
United States Secretary of State that the international community move
toward consensus in requiring consultations, much of the burden of which
would fall on the United States, constitutes a significant step in the direction of a new binding norm.
On the question of abstention from potentially harmful conduct, it is
possible to characterize practice involving the United States in cost-benefit
terms. All technological developments may be considered to involve potential marginal benefits and costs not only for the developer but for the
world community. Marginal benefits and costs represent the increment
beyond the total benefits and costs already imparted by existing technology. Ideally the international legal system would be able to measure the
marginal benefits to the world community of any new technological development, set them off against the marginal costs (including the potential
cost to the shared environment), and would give normative approval only
to those projects for which the marginal benefits outveigh the costs. But
marginal benefits and costs obviously would not be susceptible of precise
measurement in most cases. Nor does U.S. practice suggest that any such

See text at notes 96 and 122 above. The United States consulted "concerned"
nations before the 1970 nerve gas disposal at sea, though it did so only 19 days before
the disposal. See Brown, loc. cit. note 32 above, at 252. Not all states consulted were
opposed to the disposal. See, e.g., 18 Keesing's Contemporary Archives 24386 (Jan.
9-16, 1971).
145 Rogers, "U.S. Foreign Policy in a Technological Age," 64 Dept. of State Bulletin
198, 200-201 (1971).
144
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precise measurement has been attempted. U.S. practice does suggest,
however, that a very rough and inexact marginal cost-benefit rule of thumb
may be utilized to evaluate the legitimacy of conduct in certain cases.
The rule of thumb provides a rationale for much of the U.S. practice, although its usefulness as an authoritative standard for the resolution of
concrete cases for which no precedent exists is probably limited at present
to relatively extreme situations.'" Its r6le will be apparent from a brief
examination of cost-benefit criteria suggested by existing practice.
The views of national decision-makers concerning the legitimacy of
proposed action in the common environment by another state will take
account of any perceived marginal benefits not only to the decision-maker's
state, but to the world community at large. Thus, for example, assertions
based on environmental doubts about the use of oil super tankers have
recognized their utility to the world community and have not challenged
the right to use them. The assertions have instead focused on measures to
reduce the risks from their use. Similarly, there is general recognition of
"spillover" technological benefits for the world community from outer
space activities, 4 7 and non-participant states have not strongly asserted
any obligation to refrain from such activities except when a particular proposal has appeared to pose a severe challenge (high marginal cost) to the
space environment.
More difficult is the problem of the weight given to marginal benefits
which appear to accrue primarily to the acting state. It cannot be said
that the precedents permit such parochial benefits to be entirely discounted
in the normative process, at least insofar as they concern national interests
deemed by the acting state to be vital. Atmospheric nuclear weapon testing by states not bound by prohibitory treaty obligation has withstood
normative attack so long as the perceived national security benefits from
continued testing have remained substantial. Similar considerations, though
not quite so overtly military in nature, surround the "space race" and inhibit the development of prohibitory norms. It is significant, however,
that the United States has recognized the need for rather elaborate precautions against planetary and terrestrial contamination from space activities, and on at least one occasion, when marginal cost appeared to exceed
a rather slight marginal benefit (the space mirror experiment), the United
States canceled its planned action.
To say that national security considerations must be taken into account
is not to say that they are determinative. Nothing in United States practice has gone that far. When the environment-endangering activity is
not vital for national security, as eventually became the case for the United
States and the Soviet Union regarding atmospheric testing and as is the
'14 81 A with cost-benefit theories in economics, much of the utility of such a formulation

lies in sharpening the issues rather than in definitively resolving them. Cf. J. Buchanan,
The Public Finances 141-142 (rev. ed., 1965).
147 For a summary of some of the shared technological benefits, see Sloop and Adams,
'"The Aerospace Stimulus to Technological Advance," in 1 Space Exploration and Applications 36, U.N. Doe. A/CONF.34/2, Vol. I (1969). Other papers presented at the
same conference, in ibid., Vols. I and HI, discuss the benefits in some detail.

THE AM3ICAN JOURNAL OF 2nTEBNATIONAL LAW

[Vol.
66
[

case with respect to ocean dumping of obsolete munitions, any remaining
national security interest is clearly not conclusive. Nevertheless, it must
be conceded that the significance ascribed to the activity by the acting
state must be given considerable weight if the activity has a reasonable
connection with national security and does not violate other recognized
international norms.
On the cost side, it is clear that proven environmental damage must be
considered in assessing the legitimacy of acts involving the common environment.148 The real question involves unproven but reasonably feared
environmental damage. United States practice, after having indicated
some reluctance to consider unproven damage, has now evolved into a
rather clear recognition of a duty to take account of it, and even to abstain
from proposed action if the damage could be serious and if available safeguards do not give substantial assurance of safety. Instances include U.S.
acquiescence in Mexican protests against disposal of radioactive waste
in the Gulf of Mexico; abandonment of U.S. licensing for sea disposal of
radioactive wastes; announcement of the intention to abstain from further
sea disposal of obsolete munitions; restraint in the field of weather modification, in the absence of agreement from countries likely to be affected;
and the announced rationale for the proposed prohibition of the sonic
boom over the United States. In none of these cases has actual or potential environmental damage been clearly established, though in each case
reasonably held apprehensions of harm exist and have been made known
to U.S. decision-makers.
Advance recognition of unpioven environmental harm has been particularly evident in connection with activities proposed to be undertaken
in environments newly accessible (or newly of sustained interest) to man.
This has developed into loosely formulated, but nevertheless significant,
treaty obligations dealing with the continental shelf, outer space and Antarctica. It may also become a treaty obligation in the case of the deep
seabed. Significantly, even in the absence of such a treaty involving the
seabed, community expectations have been articulated in the General Assembly's declaration of a duty to take measures for the preservation of
the marine environment. It is apparent that technology users are expected
to give special weight to potential environmental costs of activities which
probe into unknown or inadequately understood surroundings.
Marginal cost appraisal must consider the availability of reasonable
alternatives to direct use of the shared environment. Some activities, such
as space explorations, cannot be conducted elsewhere. Others, such as
disposal of waste, could be. Thus, expectations of abstention regarding
substantial U.S. disposal of radioactive wastes at sea may exist without
necessarily extending to controlled disposals by countries lacking sufficient
territory for safe underground burial. It cannot confidently be said, however, that this caveat will continue to exist. Pressures for outright treaty
prohibition will be great. Even in the absence of explicit treaty prohibition, the virtually complete United States acquiescence in assertions deny148 See the Trail Smelter Case, loc. cit. note 7 above.
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ing the legitimacy of sea disposal is likely to engender rising expectations
of abstention applicable to smaller states.
IV. CONCLUSION: UTILITY OF T]HE COST-BENEFT APPROACHE

Practice involving the United States has carried beyond the limiting
Trail Smelter standard of "clear and convincing evidence" of injury. No

such standard of persuasion must be met before expectations of abstention
arise. It is difficult to draw from U.S. practice a precise standard, but the
trend is toward reversing the burden of persuasion (i.e. toward requiring
a showing that marginal benefits will exceed marginal costs) when novel
technology is involved. 149 Clearly, this applies not only to activities directly undertaken by the state or conducted within its territory, but also
to activities conducted in the shared environment by those subject to its
control.
As has been indicated, however, substantive principles distilled from
U.S. practice will not serve to provide unimpeachable answers to contested
legitimacy of proposed action in many cases for which no direct precedent
exists. 110 Nevertheless they provide a basis for rational assertion and
counter-assertion when environmental interests are at stake. They may
thus assist in the development of specific rules, such as that which appears
to be evolving in connection with the dumping of obsolete munitions at
sea, and in the negotiated settlement of disputes as new claims to use
the common environment arise.1 51
No one would contend that custom, even if it were well developed, could
provide an adequate basis for international regulation of technology.52
But the necessary international institutions cannot be built in a vacuum.
1

9See the instances mentioned in the text following note 148 above, and the U.S.
position regarding ocean dumping of municipal and industrial wastes, in the text at note
50 above. Cf. Second Annual Report of the Council on Environmental Quality 259-260
(1971). Similar perspectives seem to be developing within the O.E.C.D. See The
Observer (London), Oct. 17, 1971, at 2, col. 1. But see S. H. Lay and H. J. Taubenfeld, op. cit. note 96 above, at 191 (re space activities).
150 General standards, however, have been thought dispositive of concrete issues in
extreme cases in other fields. See, e.g., L Brownlie, International Law and the Use of
Force by States 111 (1963) (broad pre-1939 norm that offensive use of force was
illegal).
151 It will be instructive to see whether these principles harden into a specific norm
regarding sustained use of supersonic commercial aircraft in the stratosphere. In the
absence of further scientific assurances of environmental safety, the potential marginal
costs (in terms of possible alteration of natural conditions, from activity in an environment heretofore relatively free from the sustained presence of man) seem clearly to outweigh the marginal benefits. See note 133 above.
152The inability of existing international norms to provide a cohesive regulatory
system for the use of the fruits of technology lies behind such extensions of domestic
jurisdiction as the Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act. See documents
collected in 9 Int. Legal Materials 543-552, 598-615 (1970); Bilder, "The Canadian
Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act: New Stresses on the Law of the Sea," 69 Mich.
Law Rev. 1 (1970); Hardy, oc. cit. note 2 above, at 328-330; Macdonald, Morris and
Johnston, "The Canadian Initiative To Establish a Maritime Zone for Environmental
Protection: Its Significance for Multilateral Development of International Law," 21
Toronto Law J. 247 (1971).

320

TME AmMCAN JOURNAL OF InTERNATONAL LAW

[Vol. 66

One would hope that an identification of principles which run through
the practice of such a technology-rich nation as the United States may be
useful to the vital process of developing workable rules by and for the
new institutions. To the extent that those who create and shape them are
able to draw on a consensus of existing expectations based on the giveand-take of international affairs, the institutions stand an improved chance
of success.

